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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
TAXATION: Real Estate
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
Yakima County, Washington, foreclosed on certain properties for
past due ad valorem and excise taxes. Some of those properties were
fee-patented lands held by the Yakima Indian Nation or its members
on the Tribe's reservation. The district court awarded the Tribe summary judgment for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that
federal law prohibits the imposition of taxes on such lands.' The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the imposition of excise
taxes on the sale of the lands, and held that the ad valorem tax would
be impermissible only if the district court determined on remand that
the tax has a "demonstrably serious" impact on the Tribe's "political
2
integrity, economic security or ... health and welfare."1
The Supreme Court read the General Allotment Act of 18873 as
authorizing state taxation of Indian lands. 4 The Court relied on Goudy
v. Meath' and a 1906 amendment to the General Allotment Act, known
as the Burke Act,6 to hold all restrictions as to taxation are removed
when a government allots land to an individual under a patent in fee
simple. 7 The Court rejected an argument presented by the Tribe and
the United States that subsequent Indian legislation repudiated the
conferral of taxation power as to such lands. 8
1. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
2. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation v. County of Yakima, 903
F.2d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989)).
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 382 (1988) (Dawes Act).
4. Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 684. Title 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988) provides that "each

and every member of the respective bands or tribes of Indians to whom allotments have
been made shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal,
of the State or Territory in which they may reside."
5. 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906) (holding that unless exempted by statute, Indian-

owned property is subject to taxation in the same manner as land owned by other
citizens).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988).
7. Yakima, 112 S.Ct. at 685.
8. The Court stated that the contention rested upon a misunderstanding of Moe
v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), and a misperception
of the structure of the Indian General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 345 (1988). Yakima,
112 S.Ct. at 691.
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The Court stated that a per se approach is traditionally followed in
the area of state taxation of tribes and tribal members. 9 Under the
per se approach, the Court decides whether state taxation of tribes
and tribal members is categorically allowed or disallowed depending
upon whether Congress authorized the tax. The Court found that
liability for the state ad valorem tax in Yakima flowed exclusively
from the ownership of land and that it created a burden on the land
alone. Therefore, the ad valorem tax was within the meaning of the
General Allotment Act and was prima facie valid.0
The excise tax, however, presented a different problem to the Court.
Since the county applied the tax to the sale of land, it constituted
"taxation with respect to land," taxation of transactions involving
land," or "taxation based upon the value of land."'" As this type of
tax is inherently different from taxation of land, the Court concluded,
2
the General Allotment Act does not authorize the excise tax.
The Court remanded for determination of factual questions concerning whether the parcels of land at issue were patented under the
General Allotment Act or some other legislation. The Court also
directed the district court to answer the legal question whether the
factual determination would make any difference.13 Justice Blackmun
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Justice
took issue with the majority holding by opining that state taxation on
Indian patent land was 4 repudiated by legislation subsequent to the
General Allotment Act.'
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JURISDICTION: Hunting, Fishing, Trapping and Gathering Rights:
Subsistence
United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991).
Alexander and Peele were arrested while they were trying to sell
over half a ton of herring roe on kelp.' The defendants were convicted
9.
10.
11.
12.

Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 4072-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1. Fish eggs adhere to seaweed leaves with a sticky solution. United States v.
Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 944 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
227 (15th ed. 1986)).
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under the Lacey Act, 2 which makes it illegal to transport in interstate
or foreign commerce any fish or wildlife taken in violation of state
law.3 The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
contending that their actions were not in violation of state statutes
which allowed them as Indians the subsistence use of the eggs in
"customary trade." 4 The controversy turned on the meaning of the
term "customary trade," and whether that term included sales for
5
cash.
Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act (ANILCA)6 in 1980 to prevent the destruction of "Native physical,
economic, traditional, and cultural existence. ' 7 ANILCA protects subsistence uses of fish and wildlife on public lands by native and nonnative rural residents" by protecting subsistence uses unless it is necessary to restrict subsistence uses to protect the viability of fish and
wildlife populations. 9
ANILCA also contains an opt-in clause giving Alaska the opportunity to enact laws consistent with the Act in which case the federal
scheme would be stayed and the state laws would control.' 0 Alaska
chose to enact a complex set of state hunting and fishing regulations
which give priority to subsistence uses of fish and wildlife."
The court asked two questions: (1) is customary trade a subsistence
use protected by ANILCA?, and (2) does customary trade include
sales for cash? 2 Noting that ANILCA defines subsistence uses as,
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1988). As the court's description of the facts is succinct and
illustrative, it is quoted here:
Defendants Alexander and Peele are Haida Indians. Peele harvested over
half a ton of herring roe on kelp in Southeastern Alaska and enlisted
Alexander's help in selling it. However, they had permits for only 444

pounds. Undeterred, they loaded an old Dodge station wagon to the gills
with the contraband and trawled Canada for a buyer. Their plan began
to flounder when they were unable to hook a buyer and the herring roe
began to rot. They then attempted to enter the United States, hoping to
unload their now malodorous cargo in the state of Washington. Alerted
by Canadian officials, United States Customs agents snared the purloiners
of prenatal pisces.
Alexander, 938 F.2d at 944-45.
4. Alexander, 938 F.2d at 945.
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (1988).
8. Id. § 3111(4).
9. Id. § 3114.
10. Id. § 3115(d).
11. Alexander, 938 F.2d at 945. The state regulation prohibiting the sale of herring
roe as a subsistence use is 5 AI SKA Arain. CODE § 01.010.
12. Alexander, 938 F.2d at 946.
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among other things, "customary trade," the court answered the first
question in the affirmative.' 3 The court also held that the term cus-4
tomary trade includes sales for cash as well as barter and traffic.'
Therefore, the court concluded, the state law that prohibits cash sales
as customary trade conflicts with ANILCA. 3
However, the court decided to "fine tune" the state regulation rather
than strike it down. 16 Stating that the regulation works in all cases
except where an Alaskan is entitled to sell fish and fish eggs in
customary trade, the court designed a method by which eligible defendants can defend a criminal action by proving, with a preponderance17
of the evidence, that they were in fact engaged in customary trade.
The court vacated the convictions and the case was remanded for new
trial. 8
JURISDICTION: State Jurisdiction
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938
F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1991).
A Washington State patrol officer stopped and ticketed an enrolled
tribal member of the Colville Reservation for exceeding the state speed
limit while the driver was on a highway within the reservation. The
driver and the Tribe filed suit in federal district court seeking an
injunction to prohibit the state from enforcing the traffic violation.
The driver and Tribe also sought a declaratory judgment that tribal
law governed the matter, and therefore the offense was enforceable
only by officers duly commissioned by the tribes and in the Tribe's
own court. The district court found for the State.' The Tribe appealed
the matter to the Ninth Circuit on a question of law as to whether
the State of Washington possessed jurisdiction over nonreservation
Indians to enforce state speed limits upon motor vehicles operated on
public roads within the reservation.2
After examining Public Law 2803 and case law, 4 the court determined
that the issue turned on whether the Washington State law relating to
13. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 31i3 (1988)).
14. Id. at 946 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DicTioNARY 1492 (6th ed. 1990)).
15.
16.
17.
18.

[d. at 946.
Td. at 948.
rd.
Id.at 949.

1. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146,
146-47 (9th Cir. 1991).

2. i. at 146.
3. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 76 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.

§ 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360 (1988)).
4. The court examined California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202 (1987), Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), and Barona Group of Capitan
Grande Band of Mission Indians, San Diego County, Cal. v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th
Cir. 1982).
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speeding should be classified as criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory.5 If the court found the law to be criminal/prohibitory, the state
would possess jurisdiction and could enforce its speeding statute. If
the court found the law to be civil/regulatory, the state could not
assert jurisdiction. 6
The court noted that the Washington legislature had amended the
state statute to make a speeding offense civil rather than criminal in
nature.7 The court also discovered that the Washington Court of
Appeals held that traffic violations were neither a misdemeanor nor a
felony. 8 Moreover, the Washington Attorney General opined that traffic violations were not a criminal offense. 9 Because the court held that
the speeding statute was civil in nature, the State of Washington did
not have jurisdiction over tribal members driving vehicles on public
roads within the reservation. 0
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: Major Crimes Act
Negonsott v. Samuels, 933 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1991).
Negonsott, a member of the Kickapoo Tribe, was convicted in a
Kansas state court of aggravated battery for shooting another Kickapoo
Indian on the Kickapoo Reservation. The trial judge vacated the
conviction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction relying on State v.
Mitchell.' On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court overruled Mitchell
and remanded for sentencing. 2 The United States District Court dismissed a writ of habeas corpus
and Negonsott appealed to the Tenth
3
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Tenth Circuit conducted a de novo review. The Court examined
18 U.S.C. § 32434 to determine whether the statute conferred jurisdiction on the State of Kansas to prosecute the Negonsott Indian for the
state law crime of aggravated battery committed against another Kick5. Colville, 938 F.2d at 147.
6.Id.
7. Id. at 148.
8. Id.; see, e.g., City of Wenatchee v. Durham, 718 P.2d 819 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986).
9. Colville, 938 F.2d at 148 (citing 4 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. 2 (1981)).
10. Id. at 149.
1.
2.
3.
4.

642 P.2d 981 (Kan. 1982).
Kansas v. Nioce, 716 P.2d 585 (Kan. 1986).
696 F. Supp. 561 (D. Kan. 1988).
18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1988). This section is otherwise known as the Kansas Act.
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apoo Indian on the Kickapoo Reservation. 5 Negonsott argued that
federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction because Congress excluded the
crime of aggravated battery from state court jurisdiction through the
Major Crimes Act. 6
The court found that the first sentence of section 3243 clearly
conferred criminal jurisdiction on the State of Kansas over crimes
committed by Indians against Indians "to the same extent as ... [the
Kansas] courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere
within the State in accordance with the laws of the state."' However,
the court found ambiguity in the second sentence of the Kansas Act.'
The court examined the legislative history of the Kansas Act and
found that Congress intended to confer "complete criminal jurisdiction" upon the state.9 However, "jurisdiction in the Federal courts to
prosecute crimes by or against Indians defined by Federal law" was
reserved. 10 Therefore, the Kansas Act conferred concurrent jurisdiction
over crimes enumerated by the Major Crimes Act."
Negonsott contended that this statutory construction was inconsistent
with the well-settled rule that "statutes passed for the benefit of
dependent Indian tribes ... are to be liberally construed, doubtful
expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians. ' 12 The Tenth Circuit
pointed to statements from the Kansas tribes expressing a desire for
the state to continue exercising jurisdiction over both major and minor
crimes. 13 Because the tribe requested the conferral of jurisdiction on
the State of Kansas, the conviction of Negonsott under Kansas law
4
and the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition were affirmed.'
5. Jurisdiction and venue under the Major Crimes Act are defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3242 (1988) as: "All Indians committing any offense listed in the first paragraph of
and punishable under section 1153 of this title shall be tried in the same courts and in
the same manner as are all other persons committing such offense within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States."
6. Negonsott v. Samuels, 933 F.2d 818, 820 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
1153(a) (1988)). The Major Crimes Act is codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153,
3242 (1988).
7. Negonsott, 933 F.2d at 820 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1988)) (emphasis in
original).
8. Id. at 821. The court found ambiguity especially in the words "shall not deprive
the courts of the United States of jurisdiction." Id.
9. Id. at 823 (quoting letter from E.K. Burlew, Acting Secretary of the Interior,
to Rep. Will Rogers, Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 1999, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940) [hereinafter Housn REPORT]).
10. Id. (quoting HousE Rm'oT, supra note 9, at 3).
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Alaska Pac.
Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).
13. Id. (quoting HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 4-5).
14. Id. at 823-24.
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The United States Supreme Court has invited the Solicitor General
to file briefs expressing the views of the United States on Negonsott
v. Samuels.'5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
GAMING: Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
The plaintiffs, two Indian tribes located in Wisconsin, attempted to
enter into negotiations with the State of Wisconsin for a state-tribal
gaming compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).1
The Tribes included class III games in the proposed compact, such as
blackjack, twenty-one, video/slots, poker, craps, roulette, keno, offtrack betting parlor, and sports book.
Since certain of the proposed games were not played anywhere in
the state, legislative attorneys raised questions concerning the games'
legality. The Wisconsin Lottery Board subsequently requested an Attorney General's opinion. On February 5, 1990, the Wisconsin Attorney
General issued an opinion that the state only permitted the class III
games of lottery and off-track betting. Therefore, Wisconsin refused
to negotiate on any class III games other than lottery and off-track
betting.
The Tribes filed suit in federal district court asking the court to
enjoin the state from prosecuting the Tribes for operating certain
games on the Tribes' reservations. The Tribes also alleged that the
state failed to negotiate with the Tribes in good faith under the IGRA.
The court denied the injunction in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin.2 The court addressed the
failure to negotiate in good faith in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake
Superior Indians v. Wisconsin.'
Wisconsin conceded that it had not negotiated on the disputed games
and admitted that the state was prepared to conclude the compact
negotiations once the court determined whether or not the state was
required to address all of the proposed games. 4 The court applied the
reasoning of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians and the
15. 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991).
1.
2.
3.
4.

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
743 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
Id. at 481.

5. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). Under Cabazon, if a state's regulation concerning a
proposed game is criminal/prohibitory in nature, the game is not eligible to be played

under IGRA. If the regulation is civil/regulatory in nature, the game is eligible to be
played whether it is being played elsewhere in the state or not.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
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language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) 6 to determine whether the policy
of Wisconsin as to gaming was criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory7 The court concluded that the state authorization of a stateoperated lottery removed any remaining constitutional prohibitions
against games of chance, with a few minor exceptions.' Therefore, the
state policy was regulatory in nature, and the games enumerated in
the proposed contract were eligible to be played at an Indian gaming
enterprise."
Wisconsin argued that a large part of the reasoning behind tribalstate compacts was to utilize the regulatory mechanisms for gaming
already in place in the states.' 0 Noting that section 2710(d)(1) contains
the word "permits," not "operates" or "in operation," the court
concluded that Wisconsin must negotiate the inclusion in a tribal-state
compact of any gaming activity that is not expressly prohibited by
law."1 Therefore, the court ordered that Wisconsin must conclude a
2
tribal-state gaming compact with the Tribes within sixty days.'
STATE COURTS
JURISDICTION: Tribal Courts
Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d 1030 (Ariz. 1991).
In October 1989, three criminal complaints were filed in Navajo
District Court naming as defendants former Navajo Tribal Chairman
Peter MacDonald and his son. One of the complaints alleged a conspiracy between the MacDonalds and non-Indian businessmen to buy
land and resell it to the Navajo Nation at an inflated price. Anticipating
the need to compel non-Indians to testify at trial before the Navajo
court, the Navajo Tribal Council enacted the Uniform Act to Secure
the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings (Navajo Uniform Act),.' Pursuant to the Navajo Uniform Act,
6. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (1988). Section 2710(d)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
"Class [II gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are
.. (B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,

organization, or entity ......
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Lac du Flambeau Band, 770 F. Supp. at 484-86.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 488.
Id.

1. The court reported that the Navajo Uniform Act was codified at NAvAio Tam.
CoDE, tit. 17, §§ 1970-74 (Supp. 1989). Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d 1030, 1033
(Ariz. 1991). The court relied on Resolution CS-60-89, which adopted the Navajo

Uniform Act. The Navajo Uniform Act can only be found in Resolution CS-60-89 as
of May 1992, but the Tribal Code is currently undergoing recodification and will include
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the Navajo District Court issued certificates to compel Appellant Tracy,
a non-Indian, and other Maricopa County residents to attend the trial.
After holding a hearing on the matter, an Arizona superior court
judge signed orders compelling Tracy and the others to appear as
witnesses in the trial to be held in Navajo District Court. The judge
concluded that the Navajo Nation had enacted a reciprocal provision
of the Arizona Uniform Act, that the Navajo Nation is a "state" or
"territory," and that the Navajo courts are "courts of record" under
the Arizona Uniform Act. Therefore, the Arizona court had jurisdiction to order an Arizona resident to testify before the Navajo District
Court in criminal proceedings against a tribal member. 2 An Arizona
appellate court declined to accept jurisdiction, finding that the Navajo
Nation may be considered a state or territory under the Arizona
Uniform Act.In addressing the issue of whether a witness is necessary and material,
the court stated that a witness may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination only when the witness is confronted with questions to
which the privilege actually pertains - not before. 4 Tracy was accordingly found to be a necessary and material witness despite his stated
intention to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. 5
The court questioned whether the Navajo Nation was within the
meaning of the Arizona Uniform Act and determined that the question
turned on whether the Navajo Nation was a "territory" of the United
States. 6 First noting that there is no fixed definition of the term
"territory, ' 7 and after examining the legislative intent of the Arizona
Uniform Act," the court concluded that "the 1937 legislature could
not have contemplated whether the Act could or should be applied to
Indian tribes." 9 However, "in construing a general statute enacted to

the Navajo Uniform Act at the cite quoted by the court.
§§ 1970-1974 (forthcoming).

NAVAJO

TRIB.

CODE

tit. 17,

The Navajo Uniform Act differs from the Arizona Uniform Act only in that the
Navajo Act enumerates the Navajo Nation in its definition of what constitutes a state.
NAvAJo Tam. CODE, tit. 17, § 1970(2) (Supp. 1989). A similar Uniform Act has been
adopted by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
2. Tracy, 810 P.2d at 1033-34.

3. Id.at 1034.
4. Id.
5.Id.
6. Id.at 1035. The court quoted Asuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 134091(2) (1978) as
providing that 'State' includes any territory of the United States and the District of

Columbia.
7. Tracy, 810 P.2d at 1036.
8. Id. at 1036-37.
9. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

334

[Vol. 17

further a remedial purpose, we do not believe a specific application is
outside the statute simply because it was not foreseen."' 0
The court then turned its attention to the question of whether
inclusion of the Navajo Nation is consistent with the Act's general
intent." Utilizing an analysis of the comparison between full faith and
credit and comity, the court found that "the principles of comity
militate in favor of interpreting the word territory to include the Navajo
Nation.'

12

Finding that the purpose and policy of the Arizona Uniform Act
was to further effective criminal prosecution and require reciprocal
cooperation among jurisdictions, the court then examined the jurisdictional nature of the Navajo Nation to determine whether inclusion of3
the Nation would further the purposes of the Arizona Uniform Act.'
Noting that the Navajo Nation had enacted reciprocal legislation in
the Navajo Uniform Act, the court concluded that the purpose of the
Arizona Uniform Act would be thwarted if the court declined to
recognize the Navajo Nation for the purposes of the Arizona Uniform
Act."4 Therefore, including the Navajo Nation would further the purpose of providing efficient law enforcement within Arizona.' 5
Finally, the court addressed Tracy's contentions that he would suffer
undue hardship because he would not enjoy the same amount of
protection against self-incrimination that he enjoys in state or federal
court.' 6 The court stated that the language of the 1968 Indian Civil

Rights Act duplicates the Federal Constitution and "clearly could not
be interpreted to provide any lesser protection.' 7 The court found
that the petitioners would not "face any undue hardship by having
the Navajo District Court rule on the merits of their privilege arguments at the time the testimony is sought."'" The court accordingly
denied relief to petitioners.' 9
TAXATION: Cigarettes
State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Bruner, 815 P.2d 667
(Okla. 1991).
10. Id. at 1038 (citing United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269, 273 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
354 F.2d 507, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 257
(1937)).
11. Tracy, 810 P.2d at 1038.
12. Id. at 1041.
13. Id. at 1042-44.
14. Id. at 1044.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1046.
17. Id. at 1048.
18. Id. at 1050-51.
19. [d. at 1051.
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Oklahoma Tax Commission (the Commission) sought to enjoin a
tribally owned and operated smoke shop from selling nonstamped
cigarettes without a tobacco retailer's permit, license, and collection
of sales tax. An Oklahoma district court enjoined the sale of tobacco
products only with respect to sales to nontribal members, and the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
vacated the opinion of the appellate court and affirmed in part and
reversed in part the order of the district court.'
The court cited Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,2
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation3
and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe4 in holding:
[The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not prevent
a State from requiring Indian retailers doing business on
tribal reservations to collect a state imposed cigarette tax
on their sales to nonmembers of the tribe, [nor does the
doctrine] excuse a tribe from all obligations to assist in the
collection of validly imposed state sales taxes.'
However, the court was unpersuaded that Indian retailers may be
required to obtain state licenses and permits. 6 The court found it
reasonable that Indian retailers be required to register with the Commission.7 Four justices concurred in part and dissented in part but did
not publish an opinion.8
PENDING LEGISLATION
102D CONGRESS: 1st Session: Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1991, H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
On June 26, 1991, Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) and forty-one
cosponsors' introduced House Bill 2797, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991 (House Bill 2797 or the Act). 2 House Bill 2797
I. State ex ret. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Bruner, 815 P.2d 667, 668-69 (Okla.

1991).
2. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).

3. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
4. 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991).
5. Bruner, 815 P.2d at 669 (brackets in original) (quoting Citizen Band Potawatomi, 111 S. Ct. at 911).
6. Bruner, 815 P.2d at 669 (relying on U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 and California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)).
7. Id. at 670 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 480).
8. Id.
1. 137 CoNG. Rac. No. 101 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
2. H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1991).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992

336

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17

was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division., Department of Human Resources v. Smith,3 which Rep. Solarz
felt had negative impacts on the free exercise of religion as guaranteed
4
by the First Amendment.
As of June 1, 1992, the Act had been endorsed by 190 co-sponsors5
and the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion. 6 The purpose of
the Act is to guarantee the application of a compelling interest test in
cases involving questions of religious exercise and to provide a claim
or defense in such cases. 7 The compelling interest test was well established as the proper test for judicial review in certain free exercise
cases prior to the Smith decision."
House Bill 2797 provides that a claimant has standing to seek judicial
relief by asserting violation of the Act9 and also provides for attorneys'
fees in both judicial and administrative proceedings. 10 The Act applies
to includes all federal and state laws, whether adopted before or after
the Act.I
House Bill 2797 was assigned to the Committee on the Judiciary
and is currently in the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights. Subcommittee hearings were held on May 13-14, 1992.12 A
companion bill is scheduled to be presented in the Senate by Sen.
Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah).13

3. 494 U.S.
religion cannot be
case, see Harry F.
16 AM. INDIAN L.

872 (1990) (generally applicable law that burdens the practice of
challenged under the free exercise clause). For an assessment of the
Tepker, Jr., Hallucinationsof Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case,
Rnv. 1 (1991).

4. Telephone Interview with David Lachmann, Legislative Assistant to Rep. Stephen J.Solarz (D-N.Y.) (Feb. 27, 1992).
5. Facsimile transmission from David Lachmann, Legislative Assistant to Rep.
Stephen J.Solarz (D-N.Y.), to the American Indian Law Review (May 29, 1992) (on
file with the Review).
6. Id.
7. H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. § 2(b). The section states the Act's purpose
as "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin
v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
burdenel and ...to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
burdened by government." Id.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), set forth a compelling interest test in which the government must prove that a
burden upon an individual's freedom to exercise religion is necessary to further a
compelling governmental interest and that the burden is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.
8. 137 CONG. REc. No. 101 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
9. H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. § 3(c).
10. Id. § 4.
11. Id.§ 6.
12. :Facsimile transmission from David Lachmann, supra note 5.
13. .d.
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